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'Paranoia' is a construct which is currently associated with types of 'schizophrenia', 
'personality disorder' and 'delusional disorder' in DSM-IVTM (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994).  In this paper, the concept of paranoia is deconstructed by 
examining six dominant and six opposed and subjugated presuppositions within both 
the psychiatric and abnormal psychology literature.  In an argument which aims to 
provide a positive deconstruction, a discursive approach is suggested as a perspective 
















 Deconstructing 'paranoia':   
 Towards a discursive understanding of apparently unwarranted suspicion 
 
 
Not probing or challenging the categories, divisions, and objects that we 
encounter ... but rather treating them as 'givens' of the world, is to participate in a 
political act that helps affirm current formulations by never examining how they 
became current and whose interests they serve. 
                  Sampson (1993, p.1223) 
 
 
Beyond the pathologizing of 'paranoia' 1 
Recent critical analysis has begun both to examine the 'psy' disciplines at a broad level 
(e.g. Rose, 1989) and to focus on the institutional practices of branches of those 
disciplines: see Burman (1994) and Morss (1992) on developmental psychology, Parker 
& Shotter (1990) on social psychology and McNamee & Gergen (1992) on therapy.    In 
contrast, this paper will focus on a particular concept used by those professions allied to 
the 'psy complex' - that of paranoia.   
 
Paranoia as understood both by DSM-IVTM 2 (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) 
and ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1992) may refer to a type of personality 
disorder, a type of schizophrenia or to a delusional disorder (e.g. Delusional Disorder:  
Persecutory type in DSM-IV).  It is not the intention here to survey current theories of 
paranoia and delusion since a number of comprehensive reviews exist (e.g. Bentall, 
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1994; Butler & Braff, 1991; Hingley, 1992; Maher, 1992; Oltmanns & Maher, 1988; 
Winters & Neale, 1983).  
 
Harper (1992) claimed to provide a 'loose deconstruction' of the concept of paranoid 
delusion from a social constructionist perspective (c.f. Gergen, 1985).  Parker & Shotter 
(1990) have described three distinctive uses of the term deconstruction:  the Derridian 
sense of revealing hidden contradictions within systematic texts; the Foucaultian sense 
of tracing the genealogy of institutional practices; and, finally the giving of a voice to the 
'other' that is silenced and subjugated within a discourse.  Harper's account dwelt on 
this first sense in that he illustrated the contradictory and problematic assumptions 
contained within DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) of which paranoid 
delusions are a sub-set.  This paper aims to further develop a deconstruction drawing 
on the notion of implicit oppositions using the second and third senses and, in particular, 
using ideas from discursive, rhetorical and textual psychology to aid a fuller 
understanding of the category termed paranoia. 
 
Of course a full deconstruction of paranoia would be set against the background of a 
deconstruction and genealogy of the psychiatry/psychology/madness complex -- for 
further work on this see  Foucault (1967), Gleeson (1991), Jodelet (1991), Parker, 
Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin & Stowell Smith (forthcoming) and Rose (1985, 1989).  
Suffice it to say that asserting that the history of madness is one of psychiatric 
imperialism is to make a simplistic analysis.  Such a statement would ignore the 
historical 'necessity' of the emergence of psychiatry (Foucault, 1980) and the move of 
the history of madness from one of 'negative operations'  (e.g. the exclusion and 
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confinement of those considered mad) to a position in the nineteenth century where 'the 
technology of madness changed from negative to positive, from being binary to being 
complex and multiform.  There came into being a vast technology of the psyche' 
(Foucault, 1980, p.185). 
 
Deconstruction and mental health 
The aim here is not simply to offer a critique since there are a number of problems with 
standard critiques.  First, many commentators assume that an entity 'paranoia' exists 
whilst quibbling about 'its' nature.  I hope to avoid this in the current text whilst 
recognising that it is difficult to talk about a concept without essentializing it (Sampson, 
1993).  A second problem with critiques is that they often use scientific concepts and 
rhetoric to question the scientific basis of psychiatric concepts and thus to unravel 
contradictions (e.g. Bentall, 1990; Boyle, 1990, 1994).  More often than not such critics, 
whilst questioning some concepts like 'schizophrenia' find concepts of 'symptoms' like 
'delusions' unproblematic (e.g. Bentall, 1990; Bentall, Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988).  Third, 
many critiques, especially those labelled as 'anti-psychiatric' are often accused of 
denying that psychological distress exists. 
 
This paper is deconstructive in the sense that it does not assume an entity called 
paranoia exists, rather it seeks to understand how that concept has come about.  
Spivak, who has described herself as a 'practical deconstructivist feminist Marxist' sees 
a difference between deconstruction and critique in that the latter is more interested in 
exposing error whereas the former looks to how truth is constructed (Spivak, 1990).  
Second, it does not seek to privilege 'science'.  Instead, science will be seen as yet 
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another site at which stories of paranoia are produced.  Finally, although belief in 
paranoia is suspended this does not mean I do not believe in the reality of emotional 
suffering.  This would be stupid, particularly since in my work as a practising clinical 
psychologist I encounter such suffering every day.  But what does it mean to believe in 
the reality of distress?  Even Derrida has asserted that 'never have violence, inequality, 
exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the 
history of the Earth and of humanity' (Derrida, 1994, p.53). 
 
There are clearly tensions, dilemmas and contradictions here and I feel that the cause 
of helping people in distress is not aided by straightforwardly pigeon-holing workers into 
whether they believe in suffering or not.  The point is that distress is always mediated 
through concepts which are historically and culturally contingent.  This is something 
acknowledged widely by those examining the history of madness (e.g. Bynum, Porter & 
Shepherd, 1985).  In making such an assertion, this deconstruction aims to explore the 
processes and tensions involved in this mediation.   
 
A deconstruction, or decomposition, as a strategy is not politically or practically 
impotent, it does not reduce everything to mere language games, nor does it deny 
reality as Sampson (1993) and Stenner & Eccleston (1994) have so convincingly 
demonstrated.  Rather, it is often rooted in political struggles (Sampson, 1993; Stenner 
& Eccleston, 1994) or the concerns of practising clinicians (McNamee & Gergen, 1992; 
White, 1991; White & Epston, 1990).  It concentrates on discourse in order to appreciate 
the work that is done in constructing paranoia.  It emphasises textuality which affirms 
'both the material substance of language and the textual substance of material' (Stenner 
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& Eccleston, 1994, p.85) and it foregrounds considerations of power. 
 
Six oppositional presuppositions in traditional theorizing 
The six oppositions focused on here are fixed together in a network of discourses to 
form a discursive complex.  Discourses can be seen as 'sets of statements that 
construct objects and an array of subject positions, and discursive complexes contain 
specifications for types of object and shapes of subjectivity' (Parker, 1994, p.245).  Of 
course, they also map onto other oppositions such as truth/lies, reality/illusion, 
objective/subjective and so on 3.  I assume that these have a relevance to other 
categories but limitations of space proscribe further discussion (for an elaboration see 
Parker, et al., forthcoming).  This analysis will be attentive to that which is excluded or 
subjugated in the majority of texts.  The aim of this deconstruction is not simply to 
privilege the subjugated term, however - deconstruction is not simple emancipatory and 
benevolent humanism.  Rather it is to demonstrate how the dominant term is dependent 
on it, to dissolve the boundary and thus transform the opposition between the two terms 
in such a way that the dominant term cannot re-assert itself.  Moreover, the task is also 
to see what is being kept at bay in maintaining such a strict boundary. 
 
I.  The individualization of suspicion 
The DSM-IV definition of delusion, unchanged from DSM-III-R is  a 'false personal belief' 
(p. 765).  Most texts assume that paranoia is some kind of disorder located within the 
individual, perhaps indicating a biological cause.  In this respect the category mirrors the 
operation of a whole range of concepts and practices of the psy complex which define, 
calibrate and govern the unitary rational subject - the depiction of which is grounded in 
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specific historical conditions (Foucault, 1979; Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & 
Walkerdine, 1984; Rose, 1989).  Two conditions which are of most relevance here are 
the political context in which the category emerged and the disciplinary development of 
psychiatry. 
 
Miller (1986), following the work of Castel (1976), has noted how new means of dealing 
with madness had to be found when the old basis of political legitimacy had begun to be 
removed in Western Europe, a means that 'was in accordance with the principles of a 
bourgeois "contractual" society' (Miller, 1986, p.36).  Rose (1990) has suggested that it 
was at a similar time throughout Europe that the notion of governmentality and the 
requirement of some form of calibration and policing of the population became operable 
programmes.  Psychiatry was one discipline which was able to step into the breach at 
this point and suspicion gradually became part, along with other aspects of social life,  of 
that 'vast technology of the psyche' (Foucault, 1980, p.185) which was developing with 
the emergence of psychiatry as a viable discipline 4.  It is important to note that the 
emergence of suspicion as a psychiatric concept through the demarcation of 'paranoia' 
thus occured not just through the professional aspirations of medicine but also the 
political and historical necessities of the time. 
 
Within this context, such a viewing of suspicion as an example of individual pathology 
had a number of important effects.  First, it made a new sector 'of reality thinkable and 
practicable' (Rose, 1990, pp.105-6) in that forms of subjectivity became translated into 
languages of government and thus objects for rational management.  Paranoia, along 
with a range of other concepts became an object which would be regulated through the 
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'systematic government of the psychological domain' (Rose, 1990, p.106) in order to 
'govern subjectivity according to norms claiming the status of science' (Rose, 1990, 
p.110).  In particular the assertion of paranoia as individual pathology conveyed the 
importance of trust, rationality, reasonableness, optimism  as virtues of the new concept 
of self.   
 
The concept of the individual enables such positioning although the literature allows for 
the diagnosis of two or more as suffering from folie à deux or folie à plusieurs (Enoch & 
Trethowan, 1991).  However, although paranoia is regarded as an individualized 
concept, it is foregrounded against the social, and is therefore dependent on the social 
for its definition.  According to DSM-IV, a delusion is held to be a belief not 'ordinarily 
accepted by other members of the person's culture or sub-culture' (p.765).  Here there 
is a need for the social: there can only be said to be something wrong with the individual 
when they are compared with society.  Thus although there are implicit individualist 
assumptions in DSM there are clearly also assumptions about the social (i.e. that it is 
rational, homogeneous and so on).  A statistical argument might suggest that the 
implied construction of the social is contradictory since surveys report the wide currency 
of 'abnormal beliefs' in the general population of Western countries (e.g. the UK: Social 
Surveys/Gallup Poll Ltd., 1993).  Of course, this simply illustrates that a 'belief' can be 
made to signify differently (widespread or abnormal) depending on the context. 
 
 
These contradictions and ambivalences are often glossed over in critical accounts but 
are revealed in the dialectics of mental health practice.  For example, one choice when 
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faced with the individual/social opposition is to privilege the social over the individual.  
Such concerns led to the development of the family therapy movement.  However, 
increasingly there have been signs that family therapists are recalling the concept of the 
individual, arguing that the system (or family, or society) is composed of individuals and 
hence that change comes through the individual not the system (see e.g. Jenkins & 
Asen, 1992).  Thus to attempt to fix meaning at the social end of the pole breaks down 
since 'society' becomes too abstract to operate and thus is then seen as constituted by 
'individuals', but privileging the individual itself continually breaks down since the 
individual only exists against the background of society.  One of the problems with 
arguing a solely 'social' and interactional account of madness (e.g. Lemert, 1962; 
Scheff, 1963), is that explanations of  societal reactions either appear too abstract to 
theorize subjectivity (reducing social explanation to identification of a range of 'social 
factors' which impinge on an individual) or there is a resort to explaining the actions of 
collections of individuals.  Simply privileging one side of the opposition, without 
challenging the other oppositions does not solve the problem, but simply transforms it.   
 
II.  The assumption of rationalism 
DSM-IV speaks of notions of falsity, belief, inference, proof and evidence.  The use of 
such terms points to an implicit positivism, empiricism and rationalism and a privileging, 
once again, of the unitary and rational subject.  The paranoid is the person who fails to 
make logically defensible inferences on the basis of empirical data.  Of course, the 
pursuit of rationality has been of major importance in Western philosophy since the time 
of Descartes.  This was the time which Foucault (1967) saw as a defining moment:  the 
birth at the same time of reason and unreason (or insanity).  He pointed to the 
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importance of the existence of unreason in defining reason, memorably describing 
psychiatry as being a monologue of reason about madness.  Boyne (1990) argues that 
in the first edition of Histoire de la folie Foucault was optimistic about the possibility of 
comprehending a 'pure' madness.  Derrida, on the other hand, notes Boyne, claimed 
that every attempt by Reason (or any systematic text, for example, those produced by 
Foucault) to comprehend madness merely reproduced a version colonized and thus 
transformed by Reason.   
 
The twin philosophies of rationalism and empiricism helped physicians concerned with 
those considered mad to establish a credible basis by claiming for their study and 
treatments the authority of science (Pilgrim, 1990).  However, throughout the history of 
psychiatry the ambivalence between reason and unreason has continued producing two 
effects:  any attempt to produce a totally rational account of insanity breaks down 
through contradictions of one kind or another; any attempt to talk about unreason 
renders it reasonable and  no longer  unreasonable.  Thus forms of cognitive therapy 
which stress the importance of rationality are filled with many assumptions that are 
non-rational and unprovable, for example, that rationality is the best way to achieve 
mental health.  Moreover psychodynamic accounts attempting to take the irrational 
seriously may end up with accounts punctuated by rationalism and reductionism like, 
arguably,  those of Freud.  The mainstream literature today sees a number of attempts 
to critique psychiatric nosology not only on moral and political but also on rationalist and 
empiricist grounds (Bentall, Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988; Boyle, 1990, 1994).  Moreover, 
clinicians acknowledge the importance of non-rational and non-empirical influences on 
supposedly rational psychiatric decision-making.  Indeed, Maher (1992)  has noted that 
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beliefs are defined as delusional and false because they are deemed implausible with 
the assessment of plausibility 'typically made by a clinician on the basis of "common 
sense," and not on the basis of a systematic evaluation of empirical data' (Maher, 1992, 
p.261).  Of course, one opposing argument could be that psychiatry make itself more 
rational and scientific (e.g. by adopting clearer diagnostic criteria and so on).  This would 
ignore the assertion that at the heart of such a programme are certain 'hard core' 
assumptions which are not amenable to testing (Boyle, 1994). 
 
As well as providing an authoritative basis for the mental health professions, the 
language of rationality and science is highly  valued in the West.  Once again, in 
defining the other as irrational, the definer marks themselves out as rational and 
empirical.  But can it necessarily be rational to trust others or not?  Ethnomethodologists 
argue that rationality is simply a particular form of life popular, for example, within 
spheres of science.  Commentators like Schuetz (1943) and Garfinkel (1984) argue that 
there is no one reality, simply different perspectives.  To adopt a rationalist scientific 
form of accounting then, in explaining everyday life would be a category mistake.  The 
implicit empiricism of definitions of delusion is dependent on a naïve realism, on the 
possibility of unproblematically apprehending 'reality' in a direct manner, making 'correct 
inferences'.  Harper (1992) has noted 'whatever the reality of reality it is clear we may 
construct different versions of it and that those which dominate are often the ones 
asserted by those in powerful positions' (1992, p.360).   
 
The mental health literature contains numerous examples of  the 'truth games' which 
surround paranoia.  Thus there are cases where those diagnosed as paranoid are 
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reported to have fears which appear to be warranted and are, therefore, 'rational' 
(Menuck, 1992; Mayerhoff, Pelta, Valentino & Chakos, 1991).  As Henry Kissinger has 
noted 'even a paranoid can have enemies' (quoted in Cohen & Cohen, 1980, p.188) 5.  
Maher (1988) has termed such cases examples of  the  'Martha Mitchell Effect' after the 
late wife of President Nixon's Attorney General John Mitchell.  Martha Mitchell alleged 
illegal activity was taking place in the White House.  This 'was regarded as evidence 
that Mrs Mitchell was suffering from some kind of psychopathology until the revelations 
of the Watergate affair cast a new light on it all' (Maher, 1988, p.17).  Such truth games, 
although appearing to undermine the validity of paranoia as a concept inadvertently 
strengthen it in using 'a foundationalist metaphor of a concrete reality lying behind or 
beneath a veil of deceptive appearances' (Stenner & Eccleston, 1994, p.89).  Rather 
than beliefs thought to be delusional turning out to be true, I would argue that certain 
versions of events win the day through their political power rather than their inherent 
truth.  Thus Martha Mitchell was 'proved right' because of the public political struggles 
over Watergate, not just the mere existence of, for example, Nixon's tapes.  
 
III.  The pathologization of suspicion 
DSM-IV assumes that a paranoid belief is abnormal in some manner, for example is not 
acceptable to the individual's 'culture or sub-culture' (p.765).  This assumption of 
abnormality is important since it is a foundation of 'psychopathology' or 'abnormal 
psychology'.  In the same way as the establishment of reason creates unreason (and 
vice versa) so the operations of the psy complex function as dividing and excluding 
practices through the elaboration of an 'abnormal psychology'6.  They seek to 
differentiate individuals, calibrating their properties and comparing them to an idealized 
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norm.   
 
The assertion of pathology has important effects.  Once again, for those who define 
others as pathological it secures a position of normality and it indicates that there is 
something 'wrong' with the pathological other.  Moreover, it provides grounds for 
removing the legitimacy of the other's views.  Paranoia operates as a regulation of 
suspicion, a de-legitimation of mistrust.  Where an optimistic trust in the benevolence or 
indifference of others is most valued and seen as normal, paranoia is experienced as a 
powerful interruption in the world of our desires.  Of course, it is no accident that the 
statistical concept of norm has moral and regulatory connotations.  The establishment of 
concepts and practices which point to pathology within individuals parallels the 
development of a  panoptical culture  (Foucault, 1979).  The importance of this is that 
not only are people positioned by others as pathological but they may also identify 
themselves as subject to a pathology as a result of various programmes of 
governmentality (Rose, 1989; Smail, 1984, 1987; White & Epston, 1990).  Michael 
White has commented on how 'anorexia nervosa' can be seen as a system of 
self-government through: 
the rigorous and meticulous self-surveillance, the various self-punishments of the 
body for its transgressions, the perpetual self-evaluations and comparisons, the 
various self-denials, the personal exile, the precise documentation, and so on. 
Allen (1994, p.29) 
 
In the same way, paranoia can be seen as another classic example of the power of 
panoptical culture to construct and thus 'bring forth' pathology (Méndez, Coddou & 
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Maturana, 1988).  The person positioned as paranoid watches the self as well as others. 
 Sass (1987) has departed from Freud's (1911) analysis and argued that the celebrated 
case of Daniel Schreber's paranoia is symbolic of a crisis of the modern soul.  He has 
suggested that Schreber experienced a reified internalized surveillance as a result of 
persecutory and abusive parenting by his father, a writer on the topic of child-rearing.  
He was, Sass declares, a 'quintessentially panoptical being ... watching himself 
watching himself watching himself watch' (1987, p.144).  Thus the power of pathology 
comes from its construction of a particular form of subjectivity and identity for the person 
considered paranoid.  In the construction of that identity for the paranoid other lies the 
simultaneous construction of the normal non-pathological subject.  Thus, once again we 
find the dominant pole of the opposition dependent on the other pole for its identity. 
 
It is important to recognise however, that a paranoid identity does not always attract 
pathologization by others.  A text like paranoia can be made to signify differently 
depending on when and where it is embodied, who it is that gives it voice and where  
power lies.  There is a whole tradition of 'suspicious interpretation' (Fisher, 1992; 
Ricoeur, 1970) where meaning is derived from an inherent distrust of what is apparent 
and an urge to see what is the 'deeper' meaning.  Suspicion is ubiquitous in everyday 
life.  Although commonly denied, it helps us to understand the actions of others by 
speculating on intentions or motives.  Such suspicious accounts are common in forms of 
gossip (Emler, 1992, Rosnow & Fine, 1976).  Indeed, one could argue that a 
hermeneutics of suspicion is necessary in order to conduct a psychiatric diagnosis in 
that a diagnostician suspects a patient may have a particular disorder and asks 
questions oriented to this purpose -- indeed Ricoeur (1970) denotes Freud as one of the 
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three 'masters of suspicion' alongside Marx and Nietzsche.   Writers have demonstrated 
how conspiratorial stances help mobilise political groups (Billig, 1991; Hofstadter, 1966; 
Inglehart, 1987).  A broader viewpoint sees a conspiratorial or paranoid discourse as 
one used not only by supposedly pathological individuals but by all members of society. 
 Once again there is no clear boundary between the normal and pathological but the 
simple ubiquity of suspicion does not remove the power of pathologization which derives 
its warrant from the excluding and dividing practices of the psy complex, notably the 
existence of the psychiatric category of paranoia.  Once more, the single assertion of 
the normality of paranoia does not deconstruct the category since its power is found in 
the cluster of other oppositions and practices surrounding it. 
 
IV.  The reification of form over 'meaningless' content 
One of the surprising things about diagnostic classification systems like the DSM-IV, 
ICD-10 and interview schedules like the Present State Examination (Wing, Cooper & 
Sartorious, 1974) is that they pay relatively little attention to the content of particular 
phenomena and much more to their form.  These frameworks transform behaviour into 
symptoms which are either present or absent (Barrett, 1988).  Thus what a psychiatric 
patient talks about in the course of a diagnostic interview becomes transformed into a 
'belief' which in turn may be transformed into a 'delusion' if it meets certain criteria.   
 
Berrios (1988) has described how the distinction between form and content, an 
'anatomo-clinical view', became the dominant system in medicine during the nineteenth 
century.  He argues that the success of this model in physical medicine may have 
encouraged alienists to follow suit so that by the beginning of the twentieth century, 
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Jaspers could assert that 'form must be kept distinct from content which may change 
from time to time ... it is only the form that interests us' (1963, pp.58-59).  Yet psychiatry 
appears not to have been as successful in attempting to live up to its aspiration to mimic 
physical medicine.  Thus, for example, the validity, etiology, prognosis and treatments of 
disorders like schizophrenia remain problematic (Bentall, 1990; Boyle, 1990).  Indeed 
there are those who question whether physical medicine has been as successful as it 
claims.  Thus Illich (1976) has argued that the rhetoric of medical science is 
mystificatory, much health distress is iatrogenic, leads to the medicalization of life and 
that the concept of cure is questionable.   
 
By following the medical imperative, described by Foucault (1973), to seek abstract 
generalities and commonalities, psychiatric knowledge de-contextualizes patients' 
experiences, assuming that their meaning and function are not particularly relevant.  
Boyle (1992) has proposed that the pre-occupation with form over content derives in 
part from the assumption that content is meaningless when compared to clinicians', 
rather than patients', belief systems.  She has argued that maintaining a disjuncture 
between form and content enables the pathologization of that which many might find 
'bizarre' since this threatens the identity of the self celebrated in the DSM, the unitary 
rational subject (Gaines, 1992, has made a similar point). 
 
The view that, for example, delusions are merely 'empty speech acts' (Berrios, 1991) 
fails to consider the range of evidence which points to their meaningfulness.  Thus 
Roberts (1991) notes how the content of 'delusional' beliefs make sense when viewed 
from a stance informed by the believer's biography.  Boyle (1992) has argued that 
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abnormal beliefs may have powerful functions for individuals including the maintenance 
of self-esteem (also noted by Bentall, 1994); the conferring of special status; provision 
of comfort; provision of guidance; and removal of responsibility for negatively judged 
behaviour.  Indeed, even a superficial look at the content of so-called paranoid subjects 
in psychological research demonstrates the cultural embeddedness of these beliefs:  
with mentions of Royalty, the police, terrorism, the devil, doctors, God, politicians, 
neighbours and so on (for examples, see the case descriptions in Lyon, Kaney & 
Bentall, 1994).   
 
However, the distinction between form and content breaks down since the major 
categorizations of delusions are made on the basis of content:  delusions are denoted 
as grandiose, persecutory, erotomanic, jealous and somatic in DSM-IV.  Once again, 
the attempt to suppress one side of the opposition and privilege the other does not 
work:  the other side 'leaks' through, in this case because form is dependent on content. 
  Content may be transformed into numerical form (e.g. through types of content 
analysis) in order to allow a style of analysis which appears more scientific.  I do not 
wish simply to privilege 'content' in a humanistic way since this simply reproduces the 
problem; content has to be expressed in a type of form, that is, content is always 
mediated by form 7.  It is not reification which is the problem - at times reification may be 
useful.  Rather what is needed is a concept which implies both form and content.  
Moreover, this opposition is fixed in position with the others described here, especially 
the purity/messiness of pathological states.   
 
V.  The notion of a pure pathological state 
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The obsession with form is closely tied to the importance of abstracting the object of 
psychopathological discourse to the finest detail.  Thus, classificatory systems imply the 
notion of a pure pathology, a single disease (almost a Platonic form).  Foucault (1973) 
has described how, in the eighteenth century, medical science was transformed from 
being 'an uncertain kind of knowledge' through the use of the concept of probability and 
degrees of certainty.  The imprecision of diagnosis became 'merely a void to be 
occupied by the technical armature of a perception of cases' (Foucault, 1973, p.99, 
emphasis in original).  Several stages were required here:  the reduction of phenomena 
to simple elements; use of analogy to study resemblances between phenomena; the 
perception of frequencies; and the calculation of degrees of certainty.  The nosographic 
gaze thus moved from that of the gardener to that of the chemist with the object being to 
isolate component elements. 
 
As with the reification of form as opposed to content, the preoccupation with pure 
pathology is closely allied with the desire of the psy disciplines to follow medical science 
in claiming the authority of the natural sciences.  To discuss a pure pathology means 
that one does not get caught up in the inevitable bewildering complexities and 
ambiguities of the individual patient.  Measurement of the state of the patient is thus 
possible.  Through the use of diagnostic manuals a threshold of pathology is created, 
entrance to which is determined by the observation and counting of 'symptoms'.  The 
context and content of behaviour can be left aside since 'social and cultural aspects of 
behaviour are much less amenable to a scientific analysis than are biological aspects' 
(Valentine, 1992, p.4).  Moreover the ascription of a particular pathological state thus 
inscribes a particular clinical identity into a patient's life, the course of which may be 
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compared  with the clinical descriptions of cases found, for example in the DSM-IV 
Casebook (Spitzer, Gibbon, Skodol, Williams & First, 1994). 
 
Recently some empirical researchers have argued for research into individual symptoms 
(Bentall, Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988; Costello, 1992) but even here there is debate about 
what constitutes a symptom.  Ambiguity seems to dog every attempt to denote a pure 
pathological state.  This state of affairs brings into relief another implication of 
classificatory systems: that there are complex and difficult cases which require a 
multiplicity of similar, but different, pathological states.  Thus since the publication of the 
first edition of the American Psychiatric Association's DSM, paranoia has endured as: (i) 
a category of its own, (ii) a sub-type of schizophrenia and (iii) as a sub-type of a 
personality disorder.  Within these three broad headings however, there have been a 
number of definitional and typological changes.  For example, the publication of 
DSM-III-R saw the loss of 'paranoia', 'atypical paranoia', 'shared paranoid disorder' and 
'acute paranoid disorder' but saw the creation of a whole new category:  'Delusional 
(paranoid) disorder'.  There were no further changes to the criteria in DSM-IV (although 
delusional disorder was brought into the section entitled 'Schizophrenia and other 
psychotic disorders).  The diagnostic repertoire is thus flexible enough to be both highly 
specific and detailed and yet also general enough to cover a number of eventualities.  
Such flexibility continues in the way actual criteria are used in practice.  Indeed, ICD-10 
notes how diagnostic guidelines are 'worded so that a degree of flexibility is retained for 
diagnostic decisions in clinical work' (p.1).  Harper (1994a) has described how clinicians 
achieve such flexibility by using a number of discursive strategies in constructing a 
diagnosis of paranoia and in meeting challenges to such a diagnosis (e.g. the assertion 
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that the belief is warranted).   
 
Clinicians often complain that their experiences of patients do not fit standard diagnostic 
criteria:  they may have one symptom short of diagnostic fulfillment or may have 
symptoms which challenge definitional assumptions (Garety, 1985) or they may be 
complex cases with multiple symptoms which refuse to be pigeon-holed.  Indeed 
Garety, Kuipers & Fowler  (1992) have argued that current psychopathological research 
is deficient since it is based on the notion of a mono-symptomatic patient, few of whom 
exist in psychiatric services.  Indeed, in clinical practice it would appear that paranoia is 
used alongside a variety of other diagnoses including anxiety and depression.  Such a 
state of affairs is considered a confounding variable in traditional research and 
psychiatric journal editorial policies firmly police the boundary around the purity of 
diagnostic cases.  Thus many research designs have 'groups' of patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, or depression despite the common experience of researchers that 
patients do not fit neatly into categories.  As a result only research which separates 
patients on this basis gets published, maintaining the dominance of diagnostic 
categories.  The categories are also sustained by a wide variety of interests.  Kirk & 
Kutchins (1992) note the importance of the DSM as a money-making venture for the 
American Psychiatric Association and the fact that U.S. practitioners have to record a 
DSM diagnosis in order to be re-imbursed by insurance companies.  Bentall, Jackson & 
Pilgrim (1988) and Boyle (1990) note other vested interests including relatives of those 
diagnosed mentally ill, mental health professionals and the pharmaceutical industry.  
Indeed, the notion of pathological classification ignores the fact that many psychiatrists 
diagnose not only on fulfillment of (formal and informal) diagnostic criteria but also on 
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the basis of drug-response.   
 
Simply privileging messiness however, might be regarded as abnegating a responsibility 
to understand and would be useless without challenging the dominant poles of the other 
oppositions.  Furthermore, the problem does not lie in the difficulty of squeezing 
patients' symptoms into a classificatory system, since one response to this might be in 
designing better nosologies (one justification for the continual revamping of diagnostic 
manuals).  Rather, the problem lies in the very practice of diagnosis.  
 
VI.  The dominance of professional over popular, 'lay' and patient views 
As with any corpus of the professional scientific literature, it has been possible in this 
paper  to point to areas of conflict.  However, there are other views which remain 
subjugated even here simply because of the fact that it is a professional scientific 
literature.  Pilgrim & Rogers (1993) comment that 'clinical research in the area of mental 
health has tended either to exclude the views of patients or portray them as the passive 
objects of study' (1993, p.161).  In contrast, they have argued that users of services can 
be seen not only as passive or absent patients but also as active consumers and 
survivors of the psychiatric system.   
 
User views are not homogenous and are no more essentially 'true' than other accounts. 
 Where they agree with dominant psychiatric views such accounts may appear in 
professional journals.  Thus Bowden (1993) adopts a straightforwardly medical 
interpretation of his experiences in Schizophrenia Bulletin: 'I'm a paranoid 
schizophrenic.  Many psychologists and psychiatrists have told me this over the years, 
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but I am just coming to the point where I actually believe it' (1993, p.165). 
 
On the other hand, there are those who adopt more liberatory accounts.  Thus Steiner 
(1971) has declared that paranoia is 'a state of heightened awareness.  Most people are 
persecuted beyond their wildest delusions' (1971, p.282).  Blaska (1992) has observed 
'You can't even listen, to each other, without someone spying, reporting, recording and 
charting.  And then calling you paranoid if you notice' (1992, pp.283-284).  Chadwick  
has argued for a holistic understanding: 'every human being has a genetic, biochemical, 
physiological, emotional and motivational, cognitive, social and spiritual aspect' (1993, 
p.249).  Autobiographical work like this gives back the legitimacy to the author's beliefs 
removed by professionals' accounts and allows them to reclaim more of their identity 
which is so often defined by professional discourse although this may prove difficult 
since the identities provided by dominant discourses are disempowering (Sampson, 
1993).  Such engagement lends credence to the view that there exists a diversity of 
valid explanations for such experiences encompassing not only the medical but a wide 
variety of others.  Some professionals have developed theories which encompass such 
variety (Romme & Escher, 1993). 
 
Patients' views are not the only subjugated voice in professionals' accounts.  The same 
goes for what Pilgrim & Rogers (1993) describe as 'lay' views which they argue 
prefigure professional views.  Indeed, Curt (1994) has noted that 'even a cursory glance 
through the literature of our collectivity reveals that many of the ideas that we have 
about madness [in general] are informed by, and inform, a rich and varied collection of 
presentations of the mad - in painting, photography, film, popular fiction, theatre and 
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song' (1994, p.151).  Harper (1993) has argued that the location of paranoia as a 
disorder of a pathological individual ignores the vast social influence the concept of 
paranoia has in popular culture in books (O'Donnell, 1992), film (Barker, 1992), history 
(Graumann & Moscovici, 1987), politics (Billig, 1991), everyday conversation and so on. 
  
 
Thus professional accounts are embedded in a deeper cultural reservoir of knowledge.  
Barrett (1991) has noted that, when talking about patients, professionals make use of an 
'informal scheme of classifying patients based on "lay" concepts of madness' (1991, 
p.8).  In case records, however, Barrett reported that psychiatric interview conversations 
were transformed through the use of 'intermediate typifications' which were 'words or 
phrases which bridged "lay" concepts of mental illness and "professional" concepts of 
schizophrenia' (1991, p.7).  He has described how, in a psychiatric interview, the 
psychiatrist framed questions to a patient's relative, in terms of lay understandings of 
mental illness and pointed out that 'this tacit network of meanings underlay the 
intersubjective agreement shared by the participants to this interview, yet it was little 
evident in the written account' (1988, p.273).   In Western culture, paranoia, as a 
short-hand description of madness  serves as a way of marking out and 'cutting out' 
those we consider to be odd, whose behaviour can no longer be seen to be explicable 
according to normal social rules (Smith, 1978).  Jokes, cartoons and so on concerning 
paranoia serve to underline such dividing and excluding practices (see Harper, 1993).   
 
There is a great deal of commonality between 'lay' and 'professional' views.  Curt 
(1994), discussing Gleeson's (1991) work, notes that some of the characters identified 
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in her Q-sorts mapped neatly onto psychiatric diagnostic categories.  However, 
professional accounts do not simply mirror lay accounts since there is a need to 
demonstrate specialist expertise and the distinctive contribution they have to offer 
(Bowers, 1988).  DSM-III-R notes 'because the ordinary English meaning of the term 
"paranoid" suggests only suspiciousness, the more nosologically descriptive term 
"Delusional Disorder" is used' (p.420). 
 
Of course, this is not all one way traffic:  Gleeson (1991) notes that instead the 
relationship between traditional, new and old folk beliefs and professional views is a 
dialectical and interactive one.  However, although the distinction between them breaks 
down it is clear that accounts do not have equal effects, rather this varies depending 
both on the position of the discourse user and on the power, or dominance of a 
particular account.  When a 'lay' person says they or their relative has 'clinical 
depression' rather than that they are 'fed up',  we can see that there is some 
representational work going on in this use of a dominant psychiatric discourse.  Such 
discourses have the effect of marking someone out as different and requiring the 
attentions of professional psychiatric expertise. 
 
 
Deconstruction, variation and contradiction 
One of the problems with traditional critiques or polemics is that they engage in what 
Curt (1994) has termed a 'singularizing' discourse -- a new approach to the study of an 
object is proposed and any contradictions or ambiguities are subjugated.  I wish to avoid 
such an account here.  In describing oppositions apparent in the concept of paranoia, 
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there is not an attempt merely to privilege one side over the other.  Given the aesthetic 
and political difficulties associated with individualization, for example, some family 
therapists might argue for the privileging of 'the social' over 'the individual'.  Such an 
approach, however, simply continues to fix meaning at one side and exclude the other.  
Rather, this deconstruction aims to get at the conceptual policing which maintains a 
separation between 'individual' and 'social'.  Moreover, it also examines how the 
oppositions do not work singly but are bound together.  Thus, to use family therapy 
again as an example, whilst it might try to point to the interpersonal nature of paranoia 
(e.g. Kaffman, 1981), in so doing it still privileges pathology over normality.  Here, the 
simultaneous acceptance of one dominant opposition (pathology) whilst refusing 
another (individualization) compounds the problem.  In contrast, it is the job of a 
deconstruction to thoroughly problematize all the oppositions. 
 
Of course, in arguing that particular sides of these oppositions are dominant does not 
mean that the opposed pole is never heard.  Indeed, discursive work demonstrates that 
texts are often variable, drawing on apparently contradictory discourses.  Thus, for 
example, many of those advocating medical approaches acknowledge the socio-political 
context.  Jellinek, one of the architects of the disease theory of alcoholism, for example, 
has stated 'it comes to this, that a disease is what the medical profession recognizes as 
such' (Jellinek, 1960, quoted in MacAndrew, 1969, p.499 8).  Similarly, Walkup (1994) 
and Garety (1994) have accepted the role of contingent factors in the psychiatric 
diagnosis of paranoia.  The point is, however, that the view of diagnosis as contingent is 
not a dominant discourse and is rarely, if at all, publicly acknowledged.  Thus the 
dominant image of doctors (and other health professionals) is one of objectivity. Even 
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here, however, there are contradictions.  Thus in those criminal cases which attract 
media attention there is often public criticism of those psychiatrists who diagnose a 
defendant as not responsible for their actions, and there is acknowledgement that such 
judgements are not straightforwardly objective. 
 
As Lewine (1992) has noted, anti-medical critiques do not appreciate the fact that there 
are wide divisions within the 'medical model' and, moreover, it is not only biological 
psychiatry which can be monolithic but other approaches too, for example, 
psycho-analysis.  Thus, we could argue that it is not necessarily the model or approach 
which is the problem, but rather its silencing of opposing accounts.  In contrast to 
mono-explanatory accounts, there is a need to embrace the concept of 'sympatricity'.  
Curt (1994)  notes this term may be used to 'describe the way different discourses may 
co-exist and compete within a local and contingent cultural ecology of discourses' (1994, 
p.242).  Stainton Rogers has elaborated: 
Sympatric species are those that compete, within any ecosystem, for resources 
and ultimately for survival, but at any point in time will be seen to be co-existing 
and more or less equally viable.  The image is of sympatric theories that operate 
in parallel, at one and the same time competing and co-existing. 
(1991, p.7) 
With regard to the concept of paranoia, a sympatric stance would enable us to open up 
different ways both of seeing it and not seeing it rather than attempting to explain 
everything with recourse to one  'theory machine' (Lee, 1994). 
 
The merits and possibilities of a discursive account  
 
 28 
In furthering a positive deconstruction there is a need for concepts which attempt to 
dissolve the boundaries between these oppositions, transforming the subjugated (and 
dominant) terms.  I wish to argue here that adopting a discursive perspective and using 
a text analogy invites more creative theorizing.   
 
Mental health is an arena of discursive encounters, as indeed is physical health 
(Stainton Rogers, 1991).  Thinking about one's emotional state, discussing it with 
others, talking with one's general practitioner or other health professional are all 
textually constituted.  Furthermore, professionals' diagnoses and treatment 
decision-making are discursively constructed (Barrett, 1988; Hak, 1989, 1992; Harper, 
1994a; Soyland, 1994b).  Moreover psychology and psychiatry are deeply metaphorical 
disciplines (Leary, 1990; Soyland, 1994a).  Professional texts concerning paranoia are 
filled with metaphorical language which shape our ideas.  Thus delusions are 'beliefs' 
which are 'fixed', 'abnormal', 'unshakeable', 'unwavering', may be 'infectious' resulting in 
'delusional infestation'.  Such accounts contain many examples of rhetorical moves, 
especially extreme case formulations, which increase the facticity of accounts (Edwards 
& Potter, 1992).  Many categories of mental illness are well known and hence culturally 
available to 'lay' people (Gleeson, 1991).  Thus most people would know what it is to act 
in a paranoid manner and so the adoption of such a stance, or, over a longer period of 
time, identity, is a discursive matter. 
 
A discursive approach is attentive to such matters and enables the dissolution of the six 
oppositions outlined above.  First, it removes a distinction between the individual and 
the social.  So often, commentators assume that, for example, paranoia is a function of 
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either the individual or of their immediate social context.  Using discursive notions we 
can see that such a diagnosis might occur because of the operation of these in a 
singular process of positioning.  Davies & Harré (1990) assert that selves are produced 
discursively through subject positions which one can place oneself in but in which one is 
also positioned by others or by the operations of discourse.  Thus a diagnosis of 
paranoia may occur because one is adopting such a stance and/or because others (e.g. 
neighbours, relatives, professionals) are positioning you that way and/or because the 
dominant discourses of society (e.g. proscription of suspicion versus prescription of 
trust) position you.  One may accept or reject such an identity but this is dependent  on 
one's position in a matrix of power.  As Sampson (1993) and Soyland (1994b) have 
noted, the 'others' here will also position themselves and be positioned by dominant 
discourses (e.g. as 'concerned relatives' or 'mental health experts' ). 
 
In providing a location in which one can be positioned by others, paranoia becomes a 
form of textual life which, when lived, has a number of effects.  In the text of paranoia a 
number of themes recur:  the imputation of intentionality; the awareness of the 
malevolence of others; the seeing of connections between apparently unconnected 
things; and the evangelical wish to convince others.  Studies of the use of what has 
become known as the 'paranoid style' in political  rhetoric highlight a number of the 
effects such a text may have:  the provision of an account with which political groups 
may  explain their marginalization (Hofstadter, 1966; Inglehart, 1987); the warranting of 
certain kinds of conduct, for example the perpetration of the holocaust (Billig, 1991); a 
way of unifying against an external or internal threat; and a way of creating a sense of 
purpose and mission, a dramatising of history where the person or group using paranoid 
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rhetoric becomes active, seeing a meaning in all events (Harper, 1993).  Thus a 
discursive perspective is non-individualistic since it looks at which discourses are used, 
by whom, to serve what interests, and how subjects are positioned.   
 
There is no assumption of a unitary rational as opposed to an irrational or emotional  
subject.  Rather, there is an assumption of discursive variability (Edwards & Potter, 
1992) or conflict (Hollway, 1989).  The concern is to understand how and why a 
multiplicity of subject positions are produced rather than comparing them to idealised 
notions of normal belief or reality.  A discursive perspective bridges the 
pathological/normal divide in assuming that the text of paranoia is culturally available to 
many rather than only to a minority of abnormal individuals - thus it focuses on 
discourse rather than individuals.  Moreover, it focuses as much attention on the 
discourse and the role of others in positioning the subject as it does on that subject. 
 
In focusing on what is actually said and on the possible functions of what is said, a 
discursive model avoids reifying abstract cognitive constructs (Edwards & Potter, 1992) 
and therefore no longer privileges form over content.  A textual metaphor appreciates 
both the importance of 'form' and 'content'.  Here, form could be understood as the 
discursive practices (Parker, 1992) or textual tectonics (Curt, 1994) which produce 
meaning.  However, these forms are derived through an analysis of content -- it is the 
content which generates the forms.  Similarly it does not allow purity to dominate 
messiness and complexity since it embraces the overdetermination of meaning 
produced by discursive variability, 'the rhetorical skirmishes of one against another; their 
rivalries and their allegiances; the playing out of dominance and submission' (Curt, 
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1994, p.12).  A major part of such analyses then is the seeking out of that which is 
silenced and subjugated, for example the views of the users of psychiatric services and 
the explicit acknowledgement of the interplay between professional and popular and 
psychiatric service user views. 
 
It may be useful to sketch out an example to illustrate how adopting such an approach 
helps in understanding how a person comes to occupy the position of the psychiatric 
'paranoid' subject.  As Parker (1992) has noted, social structure is a precondition for 
discursive positionings.  Traditional psychiatric epidemiological research indicates that 
those diagnosed as paranoid are more likely to be poorer, be from a 'lower' social class, 
have less education and be immigrants than those attracting other psychiatric diagnoses 
(Kendler, 1982).  Here then, social structure has already constrained the choice of 
positions open to the subject.  As Sampson (1993) has pointed out, the ascription of 
identity in this manner is not simply mental, since the terms by which an identity is 
realized 'also describe the actual material realities within which those lives are lived' 
(1993, p.1227).  Texts of suspicion circulate widely in Western culture and provide for 
their characters a sense of mission and purpose, a sense of unification against a 
perceived threat.  It is no surprise perhaps that some people, particularly if their 
structural position offers them few other choices, may adopt such a location.  They, 
however, might see themselves not as paranoid but, rather as persons who know what 
is really going on.  At the same time, we exist in a panoptical culture which regulates our 
own and others' behaviour.  This goes for suspicion as with anything else and thus 
those living a text of suspicion become positioned by others as paranoid.  Of course, 
this may well happen the other way around:  the subject becomes marked out, the 
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object of a covertly organized group (e.g. malicious gossip, jokes and so on).  As a 
result the subject may be both positioned as paranoid (as soon as she or he comments 
on the situation) and may position themselves since this makes sense of a world where 
others really are out to get you.  The position of 'paranoia' tends to be granted to those 
with little power such as fringe political groups or isolated individuals.  Those in powerful 
social positions can adopt a discourse of distrust without fear of being called paranoid 
(at least by those who matter).   
 
Discursivity and mental health practice 
Discursive theories meet a criterion of usefulness (Misra, 1993) and social 
constructionist therapists are increasingly using discursive ideas, finding them both 
respectful to and empowering for their clients, including those who are considered to 
have 'long term mental health problems' for example 'schizophrenia' (Foreman & Dallos, 
1992; McNamee & Gergen, 1992; Perkins & Dilks, 1992; White & Epston, 1990; White, 
1989, 1991) although such work has its critics (Efran & Clarfield, 1992; Luepnitz, 1992). 
 How is such mental health practice possible?   
 
 
As a clinician I will act with someone in distress - as they and others define it.  In doing 
this I both work within current dominant conceptions (of what constitutes psychological 
distress and what is appropriate conduct for a mental health professional) which are 
historically and culturally contingent and simultaneously try to challenge these  in the 
manner of Sampson's (1993) tightrope walker. White (1994) has identified a number of 
ways in which mental health practitioners can make such challenges.  First, he argues 
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that critical accounts of mental health practice, particularly of their history and real 
effects, should be pursued.  Second, he suggests practitioners might take up positions 
'at the margins of culture' and explore alternatives to dominant practices.  Third, he 
proposes soliciting 'critical' feedback from persons of other cultures, races and classes.  
Fourth, he argues for clinicians to openly acknowledge day-to-day political dilemmas at 
work.  Finally, he calls for imaginative use of language, especially metaphor, to 'stretch 
culture'. 
 
Sampson (1993) has also argued for a dialogical view of the relationship between 
'experts' and their clients.  For this to be more than mere talk, however, there is a need 
for a powerful psychiatric service users -- or system survivors -- movement and it is 
likely that any progressive mental health service will either be provided by or, at least, 
be heavily involved with that movement.  It is in diversity, both of power and of ideas, 
therefore, that a way forward is likely to lie.  Indeed, the title of the British Hearing 
Voices Network's 1993 conference was 'the importance of a diversity of explanations' 
where biological accounts lay alongside parapsychological, spiritual and cognitive 
accounts (Baker, 1993).   
 
Notes 
1.  The concept of 'paranoia' is placed in inverted commas at its first appearance in the 
text to reflect the fact that such categories are problematic. 
 
2.  Interestingly, DSM-IV, the most recent diagnostic manual from the American 
Psychiatric Association is accompanied with a trademark designation giving weight to 
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Kirk & Kutchins (1992) claim about the importance of the DSM's commercial value. 
 
3.  I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.  The use I make of the 
notion of discursive complexes does not imply a psychoanalytic reading in the way 
Parker (1994) does.  
 
4.  de Sauvages first used the tem paranoia in 1759 when it was used as a general term 
for madness.  The tying of paranoia with suspicion appears to have been made by 
Kahlbaum in 1863 (Rycroft, 1987).  For more on the history of paranoia see Lewis 
(1970) and the commentary by Harper (1994b). 
 
5.  The incongruity of contradictory discourses of paranoia clashing is the source of 
much paranoia humour.  The paranoia proto-joke 'just because I'm paranoid doesn't 
mean they're not out to get me' derives its funniness from the placing of one discourse 
(that I am paranoid, hence believing something false) alongside an opposing discourse 
(I am right: they are out to get me).  For further discussion of paranoid humour see 
Harper (1993). 
 
6.  It is rarely clear what meaning the term abnormal has.  If it refers only to what is 
statistically abnormal then clearly, as I noted above, many apparently bizarre beliefs 
have wide currency.  Such a position, however, paradoxically strengthens the 
pathological assumption since it acknowledges that those at the extreme end of the 
normal distribution are abnormal and, hence pathological.  This despite the fact that 
epidemiological research routinely reports on people at those extreme ends who have 
 
 35 
not come into contact with psychiatric services and who 'recover' from states of distress 
without formal professional help (Goldberg & Huxley, 1992). 
 
7.  Of course content/context is another oppositional pairing which requires a 
deconstruction. 
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